

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The weapons of civilization: self-technologies and the governance of dissent

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ABSTRACT

This essay analyzes how liberal and radical activists battled over the subjective management strategies used in the temperance movement. First, the essay fills a theoretical gap by offering a new conceptual apparatus for examining the intersection of communication and Foucaultian technologies of the self, particularly in the context of counter-radicalism. Second, it contributes to critical Communication history by examining the clash between bourgeois activists, on the one hand, and "barbaric" activists like Carry Nation, who used bar-smashing violence as a critique of conventional public address and other "civilized" methods of dissent. The essay concludes by reflecting on how this historical clash illuminates contemporary strategies of counter-radicalism and dissent management.

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In 1839, several Clinton, Illinois women grew exasperated with a local saloon that was selling alcohol to their abusive husbands. One night fifteen of these women, armed with hatchets, traveled to the saloon and began to attack its customers and smash every liquor barrel in sight. When their case came to trial, a young lawyer named Abe Lincoln rose to the women's defense. In his address to the court, the future president proclaimed,

> The law of self-protection is the law of necessity, as shown when our fathers threw the tea into the Boston Harbor, and in asserting their right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. This is the defense of these women. The man who has persisted in selling whisky has had no regard for their well-being or the welfare of their husbands and sons. … These women, finding all moral suasion of no avail with this fellow, oblivious to all tender appeal, alike regardless of their prayers and tears, in order to protect their households and promote the welfare of the community, united to suppress the nuisance …. They accomplished what otherwise could not have been done.[1]

As Lincoln argued, many folks in the rural Midwest sympathized with the women's violent tactics. For them, political speeches and electoral politics had proven useless at addressing what appeared to be a twin menace of alcohol consumption and spousal abuse. Because male authorities chose to ignore the appeals of these women, violence seemed to be the only way to secure the attention of decision makers and to safeguard their families and communities.

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These violent outbursts, however, created a special obstacle for mainstream liberal temperance organizations, most of which were dedicated to fighting alcohol by traditional rhetorical means: public address campaigns, scientific textbooks, pamphlets, songs, demonstrations, marches, and even "epideictic" quilts.[2] Groups like the Women's Christian Temperance Union (WCTU) took pains to cultivate nonviolent sensibilities among their activists, promoting refined forms of rhetorical citizenship that stood in stark contrast to the bar-busting violence of radical temperance activists like the Clinton, Illinois women described above. As bourgeois activist Susan B. Anthony put it, "The hatchet is the weapon of barbarism; the ballot is the one weapon of civilization."[3] In fact, this tension between spectacular violence and "the weapon of civilization" – with all its associated weapons, like public address, rallies, and the other rituals of liberal democracy – lies at the core of the American temperance movement. As Becky Nicolaides has recognized, this tension was due at least in part to women's political status in the late nineteenth-century United States: sometimes women temperance activists "were forced by their political disfranchisement to resort to extralegal techniques. … . Carrie Nation's infamous 'hatchet campaign' of 1899 and the Women's Crusade of the 1870s were prime examples of these extralegal tactics."[4] In the temperance movement, therefore, women's disfranchisement often led to creative forms of "extralegal" politics. According to Alan Hunt, these extralegal tactics were "always in danger of lapsing into a coercive response"[5] – that is, of lapsing into bar-busting campaigns and related forms of political violence conducted by women like Carry Nation, who in 1900 inspired a leaderless, "barbaric" network of temperance activists that chose spectacular violence over moral suasion.[6]

To prevent the temperance movement's volatile politics from erupting into full-blown political violence, a variety of private, non-profit, and public institutions sought to discipline these activists with a wide slate of counter-radicalism methods.[7] These disciplinary procedures set the stage for a clash of counterstrategies by which different actors struggled over the appropriate conduct of resistant politics. To investigate this problem, the present essay has two main aims, one theoretical and the other historical. First, the essay fills a theoretical gap by offering a new conceptual apparatus for examining the intersection of rhetoric and Foucaultian technologies of the self, particularly in the context of counter-radicalism. Second, it contributes to radical Communication history by examining Carry Nation's rhetorical politics, thus offering a fresh perspective on a little-discussed moment in woman-led political dissent in the United States.[8] As such, the essay advances critical-cultural Communication scholarship by analyzing how liberal communicative subjectivities have been cultivated and weaponized in the fight against radical politics – and, contrarily, how direct action has been deployed as a critique of traditional forms of communicative practice.

To develop this analysis, I build upon the work of scholars like Mohammed Elshimi, Natalie Fixmer-Oraiz, Ronald Greene, and Lisa Keränen to examine two possible functions of rhetoric vis-à-vis technologies of the self: one pedagogical, the other ethical. In a word, I analyze how temperance activists used rhetorical practice (1) pedagogically, in order to create inviting political subjectivities and instruct activists how to inhabit them, and (2) ethically, in that temperance organizations promoted public speaking and other communicative acts as mechanisms for building a bourgeois, liberal ethos in the subjects who practiced them. I then illustrate this framework by analyzing

how these self-practices were reflected in the subjective management strategies deployed by both liberal and radical temperance activists. Finally, I conclude by emphasizing that this issue is not merely of historical consequence, as the contemporary importance of resistance management is a crucial issue for critical Communication scholarship. Moreover, historical analyses can help us discover the political ambivalence of conventional communicative activism and, we might hope, assist us in devising alternative ways of being-political.

Rhetorical subjectivity and counter-radicalism

A number of critical scholars have described how strategies of "governmentality" have concentrated on political radicals, the working class, and other marginalized groups.[9] According to Foucault's analysis of governmentality, liberal power concentrates in strong measure on these marginalized populations – such as convicted and potential criminals, racialized subjects, ungovernable women, the working class, and others – singling them out for surveillance, marginalization, and correction. The "alienizing logic" of these programs, as Karma Chávez would put it,[10] establishes threats that are simultaneously inside and outside the social order, legitimizing diverse strategies for making these populations visible and policing their behavior.[11] While the police and allied institutions often regulate the conduct of risky subjects with disciplinary, prohibitive methods (via arrest and confinement, for example), various public, non-profit, and private institutions also collaborate to regulate these subjects' conduct via less coercive measures – measures that mold subjects' surroundings in such a way that they are less likely to pursue violence, criminality, immorality, and other unfavored behaviors. For Nikolas Rose, these methods of governmentality "promise to regulate [the] decisions and actions of individuals, groups, [and] organizations … by means of persuasion, education, and seduction rather than coercion."[12] Governmentality, therefore, takes on a seductively liberal veneer – that is, it operates on the premise of guided freedom and subjective reconstitution rather than on coercive, repressive methods of conduct management.

Scholars have begun to develop a conceptual apparatus for analyzing the role of communication and rhetoric in these strategies of governmentality. Ronald Greene, for example, argues that "rhetorical practices function as a technology of deliberation by distributing discourses, institutions, and populations in a field of action. In doing so, rhetoric allows for a governing apparatus to make judgments about what it should govern, how it should govern, as well as offering mechanisms for evaluating the success or failure of governing."[13] This approach centers on how rhetoric functions as "a mode of publicity," in that rhetoric materializes and makes intelligible to governing authorities certain populations and social phenomena. By subjecting these populations and phenomena to the "publicity effect," rhetorical practices – as diverse as speeches, photographs, documentaries, white papers, and statistics[14] – thus open them up to deliberation, problematization, analysis, and reform. For Greene, this approach to rhetoric is informed by Foucault's classic description of the four "technologies" by which our conduct comes to be known and governed: technologies of production, technologies of sign systems, technologies of power, and technologies of the self.[15]

Although Greene focuses primarily on rhetoric as a technology of power – which, according to Foucault, "determine[s] the conduct of individuals and submit[s] them to

certain ends or domination, an objectivizing of the subject"[16] – Foucault's investigation into the technologies of the self provides critical Communication scholars with another attractive site of analysis.[17] According to Foucault, technologies of the self are characterized by a series of practices and self-approaches that "permit individuals to effect by their own means or the help of others a certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality."[18] Working in this vein, Natalie Fixmer-Oraiz has analyzed the various functions of rhetoric in governing reproductive norms. According to Fixmer-Oraiz, the media personality "Octomom," whose life with eight newborns was chronicled on numerous television shows and other media outlets, was represented as an example of "risky motherhood" – an agent of reckless reproduction that was marked as pathological by experts. This pathologizing rhetoric, Fixmer-Oraiz argues, opened up Octomom and other "risky mothers" to scrutiny and behavioral management; moreover, it instituted political dissociations by marking certain behaviors as indicative of police-able identities ("good mothers" vs. "risky mothers," for example).[19] Although Fixmer-Oraiz does not explicitly use this Foucaultian "technological" vocabulary, her Octomom analysis illustrates rhetoric's technological function in a number of ways, two of which are especially interesting for our purposes. For example, statistics and expert diagnoses serve in large measure as technologies of power by objectivizing risky motherhood, consigning it to the domain of the pathological, and designating its marked subjects as worthy of scrutiny and repression. Yet this case also illustrates rhetoric's essential function vis-à-vis technologies of the self, in that it establishes identities and characteristics that serve as points of self-reflection and ideals of self-production: the good mother, in its contrast with the risky mother, serves as an inviting ethical habitation on which subjects can model their values and behavior.

Lisa Keränen offers an innovative, complementary take on this problem, analyzing how "communication imperatives"[20] comprise an essential element of ethical self-production. According to Keränen's formulation, communication is not simply a textual referent that establishes identity parameters and instructs subjects how to inhabit favored subject positions; rhetoric is also an activity that one must carry out in order to embody those favored subject positions. Through an analysis of the programs and documents that advise patients to plan for their own end-of-life care, Keränen asserts the "primacy of communication" in the self-production of the ethical subject. These end-of-life programs cultivate a "self-examining subject who must come to know – and articulate – the 'inner-most secrets' of his or her end-of-life preferences."[21] This subject learns to assert its moral and social responsibility by carrying out various communication rituals: e.g. drawing up a living will, filling out do-not-resuscitate forms, and having difficult conversations with family members. For Keränen, these communication practices allow the subject "not only to develop a kind of self-knowledge but also to define [oneself] in relation to others,"[22] and hence they are essential "to the processes by which subjectivities are produced, negotiated, contested, and extended."[23] Communication thus becomes a technology of the self by which subjects strive to embody idealized forms of moral and social subjectivity.

The approaches of Fixmer-Oraiz and Keränen present an opportunity for conceptual synthesis, allowing us to build theory at the borders of rhetoric, technologies of

the self, and governmentality. As our engagement with Fixmer-Oraiz demonstrates, rhetoric can play a vital role in apparatuses of self-reflection and self-development. In its textual/representational guise, rhetoric serves a *pedagogical* function by establishing the parameters of a subject position and then teaching audiences how to inhabit and perform that subjectivity.[24] Yet as Keränen demonstrates, rhetoric also serves an *ethical* function by embodying the very activity necessary for the fulfillment of a particular subject position. From this latter perspective, "rhetoric" serves as a subjective habitation, an ethical way of being to which subjects can aspire. It is, as such, a collection of values and practices that constitute a political technology of subjective formation. We see this phenomenon develop when a diverse set of institutions and actors set to work on a subject, creating a structured atmosphere in which one comes to reflect on and know oneself as a person who identifies with a rhetorical model of citizenship. By working on one's thoughts and behaviors vis-à-vis the values of this kind of citizenship, one can model one's conduct accordingly and thus strive to become a "rhetorical subject" – a subject that identifies civic and political life with speechmaking, debate, civil protest, and other "benevolent"[25] and liberal-democratic rhetorical practices.

This conceptual synthesis demonstrates how rhetoric can function pedagogically and ethically in the production of subjectivity. Yet for our purposes, this analysis can be taken one step further: to examine how these approaches to the self can be used to manage the conduct of radicals and other threatening political subjects. To return to Nikolas Rose, he insightfully observes that governmentality's methods are comprised by "the strategies, techniques, and procedures through which different authorities seek to enact programs of government in relation to the materials and forces to hand and the resistances and oppositions anticipated or encountered."[26] The question of resistance, therefore, is baked into governmentality's approach to conduct reform. Governmentality, which is based in a liberal political economy, assumes a certain "bandwidth" of potential responses to its efforts at behavioral management.[27] A specialty of liberal governance, therefore, consists in massaging political resistance into acceptable expressions of dissent rather than suppressing all resistance outright.[28] Mohammed Elshimi has pursued a provocative and productive line of thinking in this regard, arguing that Foucault's technology of the self framework provides a useful method for analyzing the subjective management strategies deployed in counter-radicalism efforts. Elshimi points out that counter-radicalism strategies, at their core, are oriented toward "mitigating the possibility of [political] violence."[29] This larger objective of mitigating political violence is pursued, in good measure, by deploying technologies of the self to manage the subjectivity of radical subjects. These self-forming technologies play a key role in governing political radicalism, Elshimi argues, because they can combine with other technologies of behavioral management to cultivate modes of subjectivity "that are deemed sanitized and certified by political authorities. From the standpoint of neoliberal governmentality, acceptable subjectivity begins with the notion of the ideal liberal citizen, who is not only democratic, nonviolent, and tolerant but also active, responsible, and self-regulating."[30] Counter-radicalism efforts, therefore, rely on technologies of the self because they operate as a technology of "political ethics" aimed at "the conduct of citizens and the formation of politically sanctioned subjectivities."[31] Crucially, these liberal methods of counter-radicalism circulate through and between citizens, who work on themselves

and others in order to reinforce acceptable norms of political conduct and prevent the rise of radicalism and political violence. This includes a diverse array of conduct regulation schemes that are carried out not only by the state and its police agencies, but also by competing individuals and activist groups that have an interest in moderating the speech and activities of their peers.

In sum, this theoretical foundation clarifies the potential for rhetorical practice to function as a de-radicalizing technology of the self – particularly as this technology establishes and reinforces the self as a subject who rejects militancy in favor of orderly, patient methods of outreach and dissent.[32] While technologies of production, sign systems, and power are obviously all pivotal to this subjective construction, the technologies of the self by which we are constituted as benevolent rhetorical subjects – including, of course, the programs, techniques, and institutions that work on us in order to help us understand ourselves as this kind of subject – remain an understudied problem. (As do, of course, the counterstrategies that blossom in the wake of these initiatives).

Moral suasion and temperate subjects

To examine this problem more concretely, I would like to turn to a controversy in turn-of-the-twentieth-century radical politics. The production of rhetorical subjectivity provided a flashpoint in late nineteenth-century women's activism, as debates emerged over the composition of the ideal public citizen. At this time, as suffrage was supplanting other ideals of democratic participation, a diverse range of actors and institutions began producing new models of citizenship that centered on electioneering. This "suffrage turn" left an indelible mark on the temperance movement, in particular, giving rise to disagreements about the appropriate constitution of women's political subjectivity. One of these disagreements arose as a response to the predominant forms of male-dominated activism, which favored electoralism and stump politicking. The domination of this male-centric (and hence election-centric) approach was starkly illustrated when Susan B. Anthony, a key temperance leader and president of the Daughters of Temperance, was prohibited from addressing a temperance conference. "The sisters," she was warned, "were not invited there to speak but to listen and learn."[33] When the United States Temperance Union (USTU) began to gravitate toward legislative efforts and lobbying campaigns, many women – who, of course, could still not vote in most jurisdictions – became increasingly alienated. From the perspective of many women activists, the legislative fight to legally regulate alcohol consumption was a pernicious form of "masculine thinking."[34] Many of these activists launched a unique slate of counter-strategies, developing roles that resisted the masculinist impulses of the temperance movement writ large. As an overt rejection of the male-dominated electoralism of the USTU and similar organizations, in 1874 some of these women decided to found the Women's Christian Temperance Union (WCTU). When the WCTU organized its first national convention in Cleveland later that year, it took an openly dismissive stance toward electoralism. Although men were allowed to attend WCTU meetings, they were deemed "guests" and were not invited to run for office, vote, or take part in official WCTU debates. During the early conventions of the WCTU, many members nevertheless insisted on a referendum about the importance of electoral politics; but during the oral vote they were drowned out by hundreds of women activists singing hymns.[35]

This alternative rhetorical politics arose, in large part, from the WCTU's success in institutionalizing technologies of self-formation. These technologies melded rhetorical pedagogy to activists' moral subjectivity, providing insight into the special pressures that factored into the fashioning of women temperance activists. With good reason, a number of critical scholars have looked with interest at the WCTU, which was the largest U.S. women's movement of its time: during the 1880s it recruited more than 27,000 members, who were organized into more than 1,200 local unions. In 1891, at the peak of the WCTU's influence, its president Frances Willard declared that the WCTU had more than 700 trained public speakers; and while she served as the president of the WCTU, Willard became one of America's most famous women, largely due to the fact that she gave hundreds of public speeches a year.[36] Moreover, Willard demonstrated this enthusiasm for rhetorical subjectivity by enlisting local WCTU activists into the organization's recruitment apparatus. Thus the WCTU's rhetorical pedagogy gradually became, in the words of Carol Mattingly, "the largest and most effective organization for teaching women rhetorical skills in the nineteenth century."[37] Because the WCTU bombarded the public with thousands of speeches a year, rhetorical outreach became an essential element of the WCTU's outreach efforts – as well as an essential element of its activists' ethical formation.

WCTU leadership recognized the ethical and subjectifying power of public address, and thus the organization's rhetorical training program did more than simply "provide members of the WCTU with a level of expertise in political discourse and negotiation."[38] For the WCTU, public address was more than a simple tool for building political expertise; it was, just as much, a method for making up a special kind of activist. As a number of scholars have noted, the WCTU and allied temperance organizations formed activist subjectivities that accorded with late nineteenth-century expectations of middle-class, Protestant women in the United States.[39] According to Jed Dannenbaum, "So long as the temperance movement focused on moral suasion, women could play a central role in the reform, yet never engage in activities that society considered inappropriate to their sphere."[40] Moral suasion, which functioned as an ethical technology by which activists came to express and understand themselves as political subjects, was key in habituating activists to the boundaries that separated appropriate from inappropriate conduct.

Accordingly, the WCTU sought to cultivate subjective models consonant with the "True Womanhood" ideal – an ideal characterized in large part by "purity, piety, domesticity, and submissiveness."[41] For example, Patricia Bizzell notes that Willard "fulfilled many aspects of True-Womanly behavior on the speaker's platform."[42] This True-Womanly behavior ranged from Willard's modest, simple, middle-class attire[43] to her adopting the personality of a "noble maid" who had been "called reluctantly from her domestic duties to the podium only because her female sympathy impels her to speak for the helpless and the weak."[44] The demands of "True-Womanly" expectations, therefore, governed many temperance activists' rhetorical conduct – from their attire to their selected venues, and from their vocabulary to their delivery and diction. Thus, Willard's instructions to local unions emphasized thoughtful, feminine self-composition and propriety: "The Holy Spirit seems better pleased to inspire the process of reflection and composition than to atone for what Miss Ophelia called "shiftlessness,' by an eleventh-hour inspiration. We want no scattering fire in our public utterances, but the sober second

thought of your brightest and most studious hours. … Don't fail to keep your wit, wisdom, and patience well to the front."[45] For Willard, the ethical function of well-disciplined rhetorical practice is clear: it improves subjects by generating within them a witty, wise, patient, and sober persona.

This patient ideal jibes, of course, with the general cultivation of women's rhetorical subjectivity during the nineteenth century in the United States. While many young women in the early and mid-nineteenth century were given epistolary and recitation duties in secondary school, oratory and debate education were often reserved for men.[46] Even as oratorical education was gradually extended to many women – and, as Casey Kelly has pointed out, while this extension was unevenly developed throughout the American territories[47] – specific skill sets were emphasized in order to cultivate gender-appropriate norms of conduct. As Mattingly argues, "Since many of the traditional tools of rhetoric were denied them, women found it necessary to consider techniques beyond the customary attention to argument and delivery for male speakers."[48] Moreover, many women in the temperance movement gravitated toward creative variants of "moral suasion"[49] or the "gospel cure"[50] – forms of rhetoric that could include temperate forms of public address, but that also included gentle dialogue, communal prayer, singing, and related methods of patient outreach. The *Union Signal*, the national publication of the WCTU, congratulated the organization on the predominance of these patient ideals: "The power of this organization is not in aggressive methods, but in a quiet, pervasive, personal influence."[51] Accordingly, WCTU activists embraced the work of "temperance missionaries" by organizing socials, prayer meetings, pamphlet distributions, conferences, public prayer-protests, hospital visitations, saloon knit-ins, and prison evangelism,[52] as well as recruiting pastors and local politicians to give pro-temperance speeches.[53]

The methods of the WCTU's subjective construction, therefore, were varied and intensive. This immersive experience set the stage for reflective self-reform and subjective constitution, structuring an environment in which rhetorical performance reinforced bourgeois modes of being political. Although WCTU activists were fighting the state, they were doing so according to bourgeois norms of feminine decorum. Ultimately, these diverse methods of rhetorical training were aimed at transforming activists into temperate citizens whose political engagement reflected behavioral norms appropriate to middle-class women in a liberal democracy. This form of rhetorical subjectivity was articulated within a grid of liberal civic ideals, and thus it identified a new position for women to fill within that framework: in the words of Willard, her activists' training in public address awakened "the human voice divine" and was thus used to "educate women of out of the silence which has stifled their beautiful gifts so long."[54] This beautiful gift of public address, of becoming a subject who carefully speaks to and for others, allowed WCTU activists to be "aroused to a sense of responsibility as an individual factor in society, as a citizen."[55]

Violence and counter-radicalism in the temperance fight

When examining how certain programs and authorities have worked to cultivate specific forms of political subjectivity, perhaps the most interesting questions emerge at the margins of the analysis. For example, how have these programs and authorities met

resistance? Where have competing forms of subjectivity arisen, and according to what alternative principles of morality, citizenship, and self-fashioning? In the case of the temperance cause, we see that True-Womanly subjectivity was often cultivated in explicit contrast to a competing model of activist subjectivity, the saloon smasher. This tension often played out in a class clash that pitted WCTU activists against bar-busting radicals who violently attacked saloons and their patrons. The divisions between these two camps were substantial, with Ernest H. Cherrington, who led a gradualist organization called the Anti-Saloon League, remarking that temperance groups "to all appearances possessed a hatred of other similar organizations stronger by far than their hatred of the saloon."[56] A good deal of this hatred arose from competing models of civic responsibility, as militant activists openly denied the moral symmetry between civic responsibility and nonviolence. As Belinda Stillion Southard has analyzed, many turn-of-the-century women activists embodied a "militant citizenship" that "demanded social change in a confrontational and controversial way."[57] The gradualist approach of the WCTU and allied temperance groups was seen to be a hindrance by many of these militant activists, some of whom resorted to direct action and physical violence on behalf of the temperance cause.[58] This form of militant citizenship, which often deployed violence as a critique of bourgeois rhetorical politics, found perhaps its most radical and notorious expression in the person of Carry A. Nation.

While Nation claimed that the WCTU merely carried out "agitations," she characterized her own direct action as "hatchetations." Nation did not inhabit the political domain by improving herself via the practice of deliberation, debate, and other bourgeois virtues; she inhabited it, instead, by wielding a hatchet, raising hell, and smashing saloons to pieces – actions which habituated Nation and her followers to a militant, uncompromising political ethos. When Nation's husband died of complications from alcohol abuse, leaving her alone to care for her young daughter, she got involved in the temperance movement. In 1892 she started working with the WCTU, gravitating toward activities like saloon pray-ins and prisoner outreach. Such patient methods, however, soon frustrated Nation, and in June 1900 she heard a mysterious voice calling to her: "'Go to Kiowa, and … I'll stand by you.' … [So] I sprang from my bed as if electrified, and knew this was directions given me, for I understood that it was God's will for me to go to Kiowa to break, or smash the saloons."[59] Electrified by this divine message, Nation thus set out on her first hatchetation campaign, which took her to saloons all across Kansas. Armed with a small hatchet and a satchel full of "smashers" – mostly glass bottles and jagged stones – Nation galloped her horse toward a Kiowa, Kansas saloon she had threatened the previous year. Entering the saloon, Nation declared:

> "Mr. Dobson, I told you last spring … to close this place, and you didn't do it. Now I have come with another remonstrance. Get out of the way. I don't want to strike you, but I am going to break up this den of vice." I began to throw at the mirror and the bottles below the mirror. Mr. Dobson and his companion jumped into a corner, seeming very much terrified. From that I went to another saloon, until I had destroyed three, breaking some of the windows in the front of the building. … I threw a brick at the mirror, which was a very heavy one, and it did not break, but the brick fell and broke everything in its way. I began to look around for something that would break it. I was standing by a billiard table on which there was one ball. I said: "Thank God," and picked it up, and threw it, and it made a hole in the mirror.[60]

In recounting this tale, Nation begins with a theme that, as we will see, characterizes much of her political self-reflection: although she started with verbal pleas and warnings, this did not accomplish anything. Thus, she reasons, she had to resort to other measures.

After this first hatchetation, Nation started smashing saloons all across the state. On December 27 she smashed a saloon in Wichita, where she was jailed until January 17. Four days after she was released, she teamed up with two other activists and smashed two more Wichita saloons before setting off for a saloon in Enterprise. The spectacle of Nation's hatchetations drew fellow smashers: when she came to Topeka in 1901, *The New York Times* reported that about 300 local "soldiers" had been recruited into Nation's "army."[61] On January 28, less than two weeks after being released from the Wichita prison, Nation was able to secure an audience with Kansas governor William E. Stanley. When Nation demanded that he enforce Kansas state law and stamp out the saloons, Governor Stanley simply dismissed her and reproached her for her "methods."[62]

Nation's "methods," of course, would prove to be an important inflection point for battles over the methods of temperance activism. Accordingly, Governor Stanley was not alone in condemning Nation's outreach tactics: the WCTU eventually embarked on a strategy of political dissociation, distancing themselves from Nation's hatchetations. The WCTU and other mainstream organizations developed a marginalization strategy that attacked Nation and her increasingly controversial band of "Home Defenders" in order to firm up the borders of appropriate activist subjectivity and thereby reconstitute the temperance activist as a law-abiding, middle-class subject. Accordingly, they transformed Nation's notorious example into a cautionary tale, using that tale as a governmental technology that instructed activists in inappropriate behavior and established characteristics of contrasting self-reflection. The WCTU and allied groups constructed a competing apparatus of subjective formation, issuing statements and documents that provided mechanisms by which activists could re-identify themselves vis-à-vis clearly articulated liberal political ideals. These efforts provided the pedagogical substrate for a technology of the self, one that allowed activists to understand and mold themselves via the classed and racialized subjectivities on offer (Figure 1).

This method is clear in the denunciations of Nation that circulated in mainstream temperance discourse at the time. For example, Lillian Stevens – the woman who succeeded Frances Willard as leader of the WCTU – issued a telling censure of Nation in 1901: "As president of the WCTU I do not condemn Mrs. Nation for what she is doing. I leave that for others. I would not advise any white woman to employ any such methods in putting down the liquor traffic."[63] Building upon the "True Womanhood" ideal promoted by WCTU leadership, Stevens establishes a clear domain of appropriate activist subjectivity: one that establishes a matrix of identity/conduct by which the white women of the WCTU could come to examine and judge their own behavior. This sentiment was common throughout the U.S., as Nation was dismissed in articles and letters to the editor as a "barbarian," as "unsexed," and as an example of "motherhood gone wrong."[64] This was particularly the case in the northeast, where, as Nation's biographer maintains, "Even WCTU and suffrage women in the Northeast waxed rather condescendingly about the 'barbarism' of Carry Nation's methods and their incompatibility with eastern refinement."[65] In the East Coast press, midwestern bar-busters like Nation were portrayed as "peculiarly wild and westernly,"[66] as "culturally deprived,"[67]

Figure 1. Carry Nation, with Bible and hatchet in hand.

and as having a "chronic inability to achieve eastern standards of finesse."[68] Nation's dismissal of electoralism, too, was treated like a gender defect: she was often dismissed as a demented, diseased, hysterical old woman, certainly far from the kind of True Womanhood subjectivity cultivated by the WCTU.[69] As one letter writer complained, "Whatever ails Kansas anyhow, that it breeds such females, and is so helpless in their hands?"[70]

The articulation of these denunciations to marginalized identities indicates their location within a larger apparatus of subjective formation, one that included pedagogical technologies whereby subjects' self-reflections and self-positionings were molded. Thus, many of the attacks on Nation centered on establishing an inviting habitus of law-abiding subjectivity that contrasted with Nation, who was condemned as an insane criminal and outlaw. As one breathless observer claimed, "The consensus of enlightened Christian judgment through the land is that such a violent act by individuals is not wise. The object to be gained by the legal destruction of a joint is the conviction in the minds of the lawbreakers that the law, and the public opinion which is behind the law, condemns their action and will not tolerate it."[71] In this kind of outreach, which was highly common among Nation's bourgeois enemies, subjects are invited to identify as enlightened, wise Christians so long as they opt for moral suasion and reject political violence. On the other side of this dissociation, however, stands the marginalized lawbreaker whose violence is

condemned and rejected by their peers. We see this dissociative sentiment in the condemnations issued by Susan B. Anthony, for example, who rebuked Nation with a familiar refrain that we have already explored:

> The hatchet is the weapon of barbarism; the ballot is the one weapon of civilization. In Kansas, since 1887, Mrs. Nation, with all the women in the 286 cities of the state, has had the right to vote for mayor, for the members of the common council, and for every other officer of the municipality. Women, equally with men, have the responsibility. Therefore, the duty of Mrs. Nation and all the women of Kansas is to register and vote.[72]

This dissociation, especially when offered by authorities like Anthony, offered activists a stark alternative to Nation's "barbarism": one characterized by the quintessential symbol of liberal democracy, the ballot. "The ballot," in this context, signifies the essential "responsibility" of the liberal-democratic subject: the rejection of barbarous radicalism and direct action in favor of registering, waiting in an orderly line, and marking a ballot. It is an invitation to deradicalization and subjective reconstitution, and hence to a structured network of conduct that centers on the political rituals of liberal democracy.

Carry Nation's response, of course, lacked the totalizing pedagogical and ethical infrastructure that underlaid the WCTU's subjective constitution methods; she was merely an activist with a notorious name and a newsletter (*The Smasher's Mail*), and thus she lacked the subjectifying power inherent in the WCTU's institutional ability to circulate bodies in collective political action. Although Nation was not entirely alone in her saloon smashing, she operated largely as a lone wolf or with a small group of comrades. Yet her hatchetations sketched an ethical alternative to WCTU's "conventional" activist subjectivity, offering her audience a political ethos of *action*. She dismisses the bourgeois activism of the WCTU as ontologically "silent," as a shameful political disappearance in the face of moral responsibility:

> The National President [of the WCTU] Mrs. Lillian Stevens comes out and says "No one could endorse my methods." I reply: I would endorse hers, if she had any. … O, these posers! these croakers! These stumbling blocks! … Pray, what have you done, my dormant sister, to wipe out this or even close one saloon. My works speak for me and yours cannot speak. Shame on such women as this.[73]

For Nation, the activism of the WCTU does not exist, properly, in a political sense. While it might transform its activists ethically, it has no political existence because it lies "dormant" and "silent." Despite all the WCTU's rhetorical training programs, it produces activists who "cannot speak." The WCTU has abandoned its responsibility, Nation alleges, and has found itself stuck in the "red tape" of bourgeois moral reform:

> Our mothers and grandmothers who went into saloons praying and spilling the poisoned slop of these houses of crime and tears were blessed in their *deeds*. Oh! that the W.C.T.U. would do as they did. … I love the organization of mothers. I love their holy impulses, but I am heart-sick at their conventionality, their red tape.[74]

This conventionality, according to Nation, sprung from the WCTU's emphasis on bourgeois rhetorical subjectivity. Thus, in defense of her hatchetations, Nation asserted the political futility of speechmaking and electoralism: "When I first began my lectures I was not taken seriously by the people. … [Now] I feel much relieved to get into more definite work, rather than going hither and thither completing nothing substantial."[75] For Nation, this

kind of "definite work" thrust her into the political domain – thus providing a stark contrast with the WCTU, whose respectable methods simply "perpetuate the saloon."[76]

Nation once recalled how, during a trek to the Capitol Building in Washington, D.C., she was compelled to use her voice rather than a hatchet. Rather than approach the moment as a promising opportunity to persuade decision-makers, Nation used the occasion for inciting disruption and chaos:

> I wanted to do some "Hatchetation," that not being possible, I thought I would do some agitation. I took a position in a lobby near a door. I rose to my feet, and with a volume of voice that was distinctly heard all over the halls I cried aloud: "Treason, anarchy, and conspiracy! Discuss these!" I knew that I would be put out, but I selected these three words to call the attention to the fact that these were more necessary to be discussed than any other subjects.[77]

Nation's words thus fell like stones and broken bottles: although she knew she would be tossed out, she stood in the threshold of this hallowed liberal-democratic space and hurled insults at its conspirators. It was, ultimately, a fitting Congressional appearance for "the woman who made the American hatchet a great emblem of moral reform."[78]

By refusing to comply with the disciplined rhetorical conduct expected in the halls of the U.S. Congress – by refusing even, to fully enter its ritual space – Nation reaffirmed her alternative model of political subjectivity. This alternative offered an ethic of violence[79] as a critique of conventional rhetorical subjectivity and its political ideals. This militant subject position was rooted in an alternative epistemology of political change, one characterized by a significantly shorter temporal horizon. Bolstered by rhetorics of "action," it invited activists to participate in a politics of immediacy whereby one judges one's political existence by one's ability to secure immediately intelligible change in others' conduct. From this perspective, opting for a gradualist, rhetorical model of political change was a sign of cowardice and ineffectuality. As one Carry Nation supporter put it, "We boast of 'Our land of the free and home of the brave,' when a more fitting title would be the land of the coward and home of the slave. I wish I could hammer this truth into your consciences."[80] This activist contrasts the militancy of "the hammer," which temperance activists used to smash the property of their enemies, with the "slavish" ways of Nation's bourgeois critics. Sketching the contours of a potentially more inviting mode of existence, this observer equates hatchetations with the quintessential values of Americanism. The land of the free and the home of the brave, she argues, was secured by revolutionaries – a revelation that, allegedly, can only be transmitted by the kind of ethical transformation that comes from a hammer. But this hammer, like a hatchet, does not just transform the hammered; it also transforms the activist who wields it. Ultimately, by using violence as a critique of conventional rhetorical methods, Nation's militance invited temperance activists to inhabit an alternative form of political existence – one characterized by immediate, observable change and an ethics of action that connected subjects to a legacy worthy of "the land of the free and the home of the brave."

Conclusion

By focusing on a political divide within the temperance movement, this essay has analyzed the functions of rhetorical practice in the formation and suppression of militant

subjectivity. To do so, it offered a critical perspective on a little-discussed controversy in U.S. radical political history, analyzing how the temperance movement's creatively volatile politics was policed in order to prevent it from erupting into full-blown political violence. The essay began by examining the relationship between rhetoric and governmentality, focusing on the pedagogical and ethical significance of rhetoric vis-à-vis technologies of the self. Applying this framework to the general contexts of conduct management and counter-radicalism, the article then offered an analysis of how the mainstream temperance movement deployed these technologies in the cultivation of patient, gentle forms of rhetorical subjectivity. This was followed by an examination of the methods by which the movement marginalized radical activists like Carry Nation, inviting them instead to inhabit a white, Protestant, bourgeois subjectivity that contrasted with the wild and hysterically "pagan" Nation. Finally, it looked at how Nation used violence as a critique of conventional public address, offering activists a subjective habitation rooted in direct action. Ultimately, this struggle over activist subjectivity is not of mere historical consequence: it bears on contemporary methods of conduct management, particularly those aimed at governing dissent and suppressing radicalism. Nation's story, accordingly, illustrates how liberalism manages dissent and channels activist conduct into acceptable expressions. Much of this conduct regulation relies on police action: Carry Nation, for example, was arrested more than thirty times during her activist career. But it also relies on discursive enemy production[81] and subjective reconstitution, as we saw with the ethical and pedagogical techniques deployed among temperance factions. These methods of dissent management are an especially important problem today, as counter-radicalism strategies are becoming increasingly common – and now computationally sophisticated – methods of political regulation.[82]

In the end, it would be easy to offer a rote condemnation of Nation's quaint morality and her barbaric "methods," but, as Fran Grace reminds us,

> we must … reckon with Nation's claim that she chose violence because she lacked political power; she had tried every other avenue and no one in the "establishment" listened. She threw rocks and swung a hatchet because she was not allowed to vote on a matter for which she felt a definite passion. Exclusion does have consequences. At times these consequences are violent.[83]

As we can all recognize, exclusion does have its "consequences." Yet, when reflecting on Nation's case, there arises an issue of tremendous contemporary political importance: how are we to judge the legitimacy of collective political subjects that are constituted via claims to exclusion? After all, the rising global wave of populist reaction is bolstered by claims to exclusion, dispossession, and oppression. The clash between Nation's radicals and bourgeois women temperance activists sketches an ambivalent political portrait: neither group fits neatly into historical or contemporary categories of power and privilege, and it does not quite seem fair to accuse either camp – both of which were constituted by at least some legitimate claims to oppression – of something like punching down. The important lesson, perhaps, is to acknowledge the potential dangerousness and political ambivalence of claims to oppression while focusing on what Nation's example tells us about counter-radicalism, the bourgeois management of subjectivity, and cannibalism among different vectors of resistance. While claims to exclusion might not, in themselves, warrant Nation's style of direct action, her struggles can

teach us about the bourgeois management of dissent and its by-production of marginal counter-resistances. On a number of levels, Nation might not set the most attractive moral example; but we should not overlook the courage and political creativity she demonstrated in her rebellion against the saloon as a symbol of "gilded" East Coast capital infiltrating the plains.[84] Her refusals and rebellions thus ring of what Matthew S. May calls "desertion," in particular "the desertion of the public and public speech as instruments of mediation; in sum, *causing trouble everywhere*."[85] At the very least, Nation's insistence on causing trouble everywhere can inspire those of us interested in composing alternative modes of subjectivity that resist today's persistent conventionalities.

Notes

1. Quoted in James Henry Potts, *Black and White, or, The Saloon Versus Temperance: The Greatest Problem Confronting Our Nation Today* (Detroit, MI: F.B. Dickerson Publishing, 1908), 270–1.
2. See Sue Zaeske, *Signatures of Citizenship: Petitioning, Antislavery, and Women's Political Identity* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003), 23, 43; Sheryl Hurner, "Discursive Identity Formation of Suffrage Women: Reframing the 'Cult of True Womanhood' through Song," *Western Journal of Communication* 70, no. 3 (2006): 234–60; and Sue Carter, "Using the Needle as a Sword: Needlework as Epideictic Rhetoric in the Women's Christian Temperance Union," in *Rhetorical Agendas: Political, Ethical, Spiritual*, ed. Patricia Bizzell (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum), 325–34. Also see Joshua Reeves, "If You See Something, Say Something: Surveillance, Communication, and Citizenship in American Life" (PhD diss., North Carolina State University, 2013), 119–65.
3. Susan B. Anthony, "The Weapon of Barbarism," *Zion's Herald* 79, no. 9 (27 February 1901): 258.
4. Becky M. Nicolaides, "The State's 'Sharp Line Between the Sexes': Women Alcohol and the Law in the United States, 1850–1980," *Addiction* 91, no. 8 (1996): 1220.
5. Alan Hunt, *Governing Morals: A Social History of Moral Regulation* (Cambridge University Press, 1999), 100.
6. See Anthony, "The Weapon of Barbarism," 258.
7. See Shawn J. Parry-Giles, "The Veeps Audition – Campaign 2020: Disciplining Kamala Harris," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 107, no. 4 (2021): 443–50.
8. As such, the essay is less interested in the rhetoric of Nation's violence, or in the ontological relationship between rhetoric and violence more generally. For examples of work in this vein, see Heather A. Hayes, *Violent Subjects and Rhetorical Cartography in the Age of the Terror Wars* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016); Megan Foley, "Of Violence and Rhetoric: An Ethical Aporia," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 99, no. 2 (2013): 191–9; as well as the other essays in the 2013 *Quarterly Journal of Speech* (99, no. 2) forum on "the violence of rhetoric" edited by Jeremy Engels.
9. See, for example, Shayne Pepper, "Subscribing to Governmental Rationality: HBO and the AIDS Epidemic," *Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies* 11, no. 2 (2014): 120–38; Cara Willis, "Technology and/as Governmentality: The Production of Young Rural Women as Low-Tech Laboring Subjects in China," *Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies* 10, no. 4: 341–58; Bradley Jobes and Roopali Mukherjee, "From California to Michigan: Race, Rationality, and Neoliberal Governmentality," *Communication and Critical Cultural Studies* 7, no. 4: 401–22; Godfried Asante, "Empowerment Discourses of Representatives of LGBTS Human Rights NGOs in Ghana," *Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies* 19, no. 4: 344–62.
10. Karma Chávez, *The Borders of AIDS: Race, Quarantine, and Resistance* (Seattle: The University of Washington Press, 2021), 3–18.

11. Michel Foucault, *Abnormal: Lectures at the College de France, 1974 –1975*, trans. Graham Burchell (London: Verso, 2016). Also see Jeremy Packer and Joshua Reeves, "Making Enemies with Media," *Communication and the Public* 5, no. 1–2 (2020): 16–25.
12. Nikolas Rose, "Governing 'Advanced' Liberal Democracies," in *Foucault and Political Reason: Liberalism, Neo-liberalism, and Rationalities of Government*, eds. Andrew Barry, Thomas Osborne, and Nikolas Rose (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1996), 42, 50.
13. Ronald Walter Greene, "Another Materialist Rhetoric," *Critical Studies in Mass Communication* 15, no. 1 (1998): 22. See also Ronald Walter Greene, "More Materialist Rhetoric," *Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies* 12, no. 4 (2015): 414–17.
14. Greene, "Another Materialist Rhetoric," 32.
15. Michel Foucault, "Technologies of the Self," in *Technologies of the Self*, eds. Luther H. Martin, Huck Gutman, and Patrick H. Hutton (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1988), 18–19.
16. Greene, "Another Materialist Rhetoric," 31.
17. See Dave Tell, "Rhetoric and Power: An Inquiry into Foucault's Critique of Confession," *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 43, no. 2 (2010): 95–117; Bradford Vivian, "The Threshold of the Self," *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 33, no. 4 (2000): 303–18.
18. Foucault, "Technologies of the Self," 18.
19. Natalie Fixmer-Oraiz, "(In)Conceivable: Risky Reproduction and the Rhetorical Labors of Octomom," *Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies* 11, no. 3 (2014): 231–49.
20. Lisa Keränen, "Technologies of the Self at the End of Life: Pastoral Power and the Rhetoric of Advanced Care Planning," in *After the Genome: A Language for Our Biotechnological Future*, eds. Michael J. Hyde and James A. Herrick (Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2013), 211–12.
21. Keränen, "Technologies of the Self," 204.
22. Keränen, "Technologies of the Self," 208.
23. Keränen, "Technologies of the Self," 203.
24. Of course, this topic has been explored in related ways, but from a different conceptual lens, by scholars like Maurice Charland. See especially Charland, "Constitutive Rhetoric," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 73, no. 2 (1987): 133–50.
25. Erin Bulut, Robert Mejia, and Cameron McCarthy, "Governance Through Philitainment: Playing the Benevolent Subject," *Communication and Critical/Cultural Studie*s 11, no. 4 (2014): 342–61.
26. Rose, "Governing 'Advanced' Liberal Democracies," 42.
27. Michel Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the College de France, 1976–1977*, trans. Graham Burchell (New York: Picador, 2007), 21.
28. For other important takes on the liberal management of resistance, see Jodi Dean, *Democracy and Other Neoliberal Fantasies: Communicative Capitalism and Left Politics* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2009) and John Tagg, *The Burden of Representation: Essays on Photographies and Histories* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993).
29. Mohammed Elshimi, "De-radicalization Interventions as Technologies of the Self: A Foucauldian Analysis," *Critical Studies on Terrorism* 8, no. 1 (2015): 124.
30. Elshimi, "De-radicalization Interventions as Technologies of the Self," 124.
31. Elshimi, "De-radicalization Interventions as Technologies o the Self," 124. Also see Joshua Reeves, "Rhetoric, Violence, and the Subject of Civility," *Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies* 19, no. 1 (2022): 98.
32. See Billie Murray, "Violence and Nonviolence in the Rhetoric of Social Protest," *Rhetoric & Public Affairs* 25, no. 3 (2022): 145–66.
33. See Lettie C. Osmer, "Watchman, What of the Night?," *Annual Report of the Ohio State Board of Agriculture* 60 (1905): 591.
34. Ruth Rose, *The Lost Sisterhood: Prostitution in America, 1900–1918* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982), 12.

35. Jack S. Blocker, "Separate Paths: Suffragists and the Women's Temperance Crusade," *Signs* 10, no. 3 (1985): 463.
36. See Carolyn De Swarte Gifford and Amy R. Slagell, "Introduction," in *Let Something Good Be Said: Speeches and Writings of Frances E. Willard*, eds. Carolyn De Swarte Gifford and Amy R. Slagell (Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 2007), xxiii.
37. Carol Mattingly, *Well-Tempered Women: Nineteenth-Century Temperance Rhetoric* (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1998), 58.
38. Wendy Sharer, *Vote and Voice: Women's Organizations and Political Literacy, 1915–1930* (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 2004), 26.
39. Patricia Bizzell, "Chastity Warrants for Women Public Speakers in Nineteenth-Century American Fiction," *Rhetoric Society Quarterly* 40, no. 4 (2010): 385–401.
40. Jed Dannenbaum, "The Origins of Temperance Activism and Militancy among American Women," *Journal of Social History* 15 (1981): 237.
41. Maegan Parker, "Desiring Citizenship: A Rhetorical Analysis of the Wells/Willard Controversy," *Women's Studies in Communication* 31, no. 1 (2008): 59.
42. Bizzell, "Chastity Warrants for Women Public Speakers," 387.
43. Carol Mattingly, "Friendly Dress: A Disciplined Use," *Rhetoric Society Quarterly* 29, no. 2 (1999): 25–45. See also Bizzell, "Chastity Warrants for Women Public Speakers," 388.
44. Nan Johnson, *Gender and Rhetorical Space in American Life* (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois Press, 2002), 113. Quoted in Bizzell Patricia Bizzell, "Frances Willard, Phoebe Paler, and the Ethos of the Methodist Woman Preacher," *Rhetoric Society Quarterly* 36, no. 4 (2006): 378.
45. Frances E. Willard, *Women and Temperance, or, The Work and Workers of The Woman's Christian Temperance Union* (Hartford, CT: Park Publishing, 1883), 617, 621.
46. Suzanne Bordelon, "'Resolved That the Mind of Woman Is Not Inferior to That of Man': Women's Oratorical Preparation in California State Normal School Coeducational Literary Societies in the Late Nineteenth Century," *Advances in the History of Rhetoric* 15 (2012): 164–71.
47. Casey Ryan Kelly, "Women's Rhetorical Agency in the American West: The New Penelope," *Women's Studies in Communication* 32, no. 2 (2009): 203–31.
48. See Mattingly, "Friendly Dress," 26. Also see Karlyn Kohrs Campbell, *Man Cannot Speak for Her: A Critical Study of Early Feminist Rhetoric* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1989), 8.
49. Erin M. Masson, "The Women's Christian Temperance Union 18874–1898: Combating Domestic Violence," *William & Mary Journal of Race, Gender, and Social Justice* 3, no. 1 (1997): 170, n. 51.
50. Hunt, *Governing Morals*, 100.
51. Quoted in Thekla Ellen Joiner, *Sin in the City: Chicago and Revivalism, 1880–1920* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2007), 95, fn. 53.
52. Fanny DuBois Chase, *Glimpses of a Popular Movement: or, Sketches of the WCTU of Pennsylvania* (Philadelphia: Leeds Press, 1899), 10. Also see Dannenbaum, "The Origins of Temperance Activism," 242.
53. Brooklyn Temperance Union of Christian Women, *Third Annual Report of the Temperance Union of Christian Women* (New York: N. Tibbals and Son, 1877), 12.
54. Willard, *Women and Temperance*, 618.
55. Willard, *Women and Temperance*, 482.
56. See K. Austin Kerr, "Organizing for Reform: The Anti-Saloon League and Innovation in Politics," *American Quarterly* 32, no. 1 (1980): 40.
57. Belinda A. Stillion Southard, *Militant Citizenship: Rhetorical Strategies of the National Woman's Party, 1913–1920* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2011), 14.
58. For an analysis of Willard and the WCTU's gradualism, see Amy R. Slagell, "The Rhetorical Structure of Frances E. Willard's Campaign for Woman Suffrage, 1876–96," *Rhetoric and Public Affairs* 4, no. 1 (2001): 1–23.
59. Carry A. Nation, *The Use and Need of the Life of Carry A. Nation* (Topeka: F.M. Steve and Sons, 1904), 69–70.

60. Nation, *The Use and Need of the Life of Carry A. Nation*, 71.
61. Carrie Nation's "Army," *New York Times*, February 4, 1901, 3.
62. "The New Kansas Crusade," *The American Monthly Review of Reviews* 23, no. 3 (1901): 260.
63. *Smasher's Mail*, July 1901, 10.
64. Fran Grace, *Carry A. Nation: Retelling the Life* (Bloomington, IN: University of Indiana Press, 2001), 101.
65. Grace, *Carry A. Nation*, 221.
66. Grace, *Carry A. Nation*, 222.
67. Grace, *Carry A. Nation*, 221.
68. Grace, *Carry A. Nation*, 101.
69. Grace, *Carry A. Nation*, 6.
70. "Kansas, Speak Up!" *Life* 37, no. 953 (February 7, 1901): 108.
71. "Mrs. Nation's Temperance Crusade," *Christian Observer* 89, no. 9 (February 27, 1901): 1. Similar sentiment is betrayed in other contemporary temperance arguments, including Albert Griffin's *An Earnest Appeal for the Substitution of Christian for Pagan Methods in All Moral Reform Work* (Topeka, 1901).
72. Anthony, "The Weapon of Barbarism," 258. For more on Anthony's temperate temperance rhetoric, see Carmen Heider, "Suffrage, Self-Determination, and the Women's Christian Temperance Union in Nebraska, 1879–1882," *Rhetoric and Public Affairs* 8, no. 1 (2005): 85–107.
73. *Smasher's Mail*, November 1901, 26.
74. Nation, *The Use and Need of the Life of Carry A. Nation*, 232.
75. Nation, *The Use and Need of the Life of Carry A. Nation*, 133, 172.
76. Nation, *The Use and Need of the Life of Carry A. Nation*, 171.
77. Nation, *The Use and Need of the Life of Carry A. Nation*, 104.
78. "Hatchet Hatchery," *Hardware Dealers' Magazine* 15, no. 4 (1901): 627.
79. See Georges Sorel, *Reflections on Violence*, ed. Jeremy Jennings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 175–214.
80. "Aunt Samantha," *Colman's Rural World* 67, no. 23 (June 4, 1914): 10.
81. For a critical examination, see Olga Baysha, *War, Peace, and Populist Discourse in Ukraine* (New York and London: Routledge, 2023), 33–41.
82. See Elshimi, "De-radicalization Interventions as Technologies of the Self."
83. Grace, *Carry A. Nation*, xii.
84. See Grace, *Carry A. Nation*, 38.
85. Matthew S. May, *Soapbox Rebellion: The Hobo Orator Union and the Free Speech Fights of the Industrial Workers of the World, 1909–1916* (Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama Press, 2013). Italics in original.

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